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Discard bans have been proposed as part of management policies aimed at balanced harvest (BH). Nationwide discard bans exist in several coun-
tries, including Chile, the European Union, Norway, and NewZealand.We analysed experiences from these countries to determine whether or not
discard bans are in contradiction with BH, based on six aspects: policy objectives, species/sizes applicability, accompanying technical measures, at-
sea monitoring and control, and possible impacts. When discard bans are fully implemented, ﬁshing operations change to more selective ﬁshing,
typically targetingbigger individuals ofmain commercial species. This is consistentwith theprimaryobjectiveofmanydiscard policies, i.e. to reduce
unwanted catch. In contrast, proponents of BH argue that broader catch diversity, a product of a widespread harvest strategy, should be sought to
avoid major impacts on the ecosystem. Our analysis demonstrates that the scope of discard bans is often limited to main commercial species, al-
though usually they can be extended to include more ecosystem components. Some of the policies examined also prohibit the use of unwanted
catches for human consumption, thus limiting their effective use. However, the implementation of discard bans requires high levels of at-seamon-
itoring and effective control, and/or strong incentives to ﬁshmore selectively, neither of which applied inmost cases examined. We conclude that
if discard bans were set differently, they could contribute to ﬁshery management policies aiming at BH. Their goals should be in line with BH, i.e. to
reach a wider global harvest pattern, or at least be established within management regimes that promote high compliance. Finally, the extent to
which a discard ban contributes to achieve BH depends also on the relative importance of the ecosystem benthic and megafauna components.
Keywords: full catch retention, global harvest pattern, policy goals, selective ﬁshing.
Introduction
Recent studies reviewingfisheries selectivity in an ecosystemcontext
have concluded that intense and highly selective fishing has a strong
impact on ecosystemstructure, stability, resilience, andproductivity
(e.g. Zhou et al., 2010; Rochet et al., 2011). Balanced harvest (BH), a
strategy that distributes fishing pressure across the widest possible
range of trophic levels, sizes, and species, in proportion to their
natural productivity (reducing fishing pressure where it is exces-
sive), has been proposed to counter this effect (Garcia et al.,
2012). This involves the harvest of some ecosystem components
that are not (yet) fully utilized by society. Such catch is currently
likely to be discarded, particularly in the developed world, while
in view of food security, all catches (commercial and non-
commercial) should be landed and utilized. In this context, full
catch retention policies (also known as discard bans) have been
proposed as part of management policies aimed at BH (Garcia
et al., 2011, 2015). This implies that markets and the processing
sector will need to adapt to accommodate a wider range of catch
components, and even be incentivized to do so, for example, by
(i) enhancing industrial processing for animal feed or human con-
sumption; (ii) changing status from non-target to target species or
sizes; and (iii) consuming less-utilized species (Garcia et al., 2012).
In the past, the practice of discarding part of the catch at sea has
largely been unregulated in most fishery jurisdictions (Heath et al.,
2014). However, the landing obligation of the recently reformed
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU) is a
prominent example of a recent trend in fisheries management to
limit discarding, reflecting successful public opinion campaigns
that see it as a waste of resources (Borges, 2015). The objectives of
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discard bans are usually (i) to contribute to the sustainability of fish-
eries through the improved implementation of catch limits and (ii)
to reduceunwanted catch.The latterobjective recognizes thatnot all
catch can be utilized (due to stock sustainability, markets, societal
values, etc.) and should therefore not be caught in the first place.
On the other hand, proponents of BH argue that broader catch di-
versity, stemming from a widespread harvest strategy, is needed to
reach BH.
BH and discard bans appear to be in conflict with each other,
since the former promotes a proportionate approach to fisheries
removals in relation to ecosystem components, while the latter, by
prohibiting discards from occurring, eventually limits removals in
away that is unlikely to be in proportion to ecosystem components.
BH is anapriorifisheriesmanagement strategy, i.e. trying toplan the
catch to be caught, while discard bans are an a posteriori fisheries
policy tool, dealing with the catch that has already been caught, al-
though also aiming at indirectly changing fishing practices. In other
words, BH is primarily about fishingmortality, not what ultimately
happens to the catch. But in a BH perspective, it is important to
know the impact of discarding vs. not discarding the catch back
into the sea (and, instead, landing it). Does discarding (or not dis-
carding) part of the catch make the ecosystem more unbalanced?
Will discard bans be associated with increased market acceptance
of otherwise discarded species and sizes, or will they instead lead
to increased selectivity and hence counter BH?
This paper discusses the relationship between discard bans and
BH based on a brief summary of selected examples of discard bans
around the world. The main issues of the discard policy examples
chosen were assessed generally as well as in the specific context
of BH by answering six questions: (i) what are the goals of the
discard ban?, (ii) what is it illegal to discard (species, sizes) and
when and by whom (season/time/fishery)?, (iii) were there any
technical measures (compulsory or not) introduced together with
the ban?, (iv) was the ban associated with (increased) compulsory
at-sea monitoring?, (v) what are the sanctions for violating the
ban, and is thereany(at-sea) control?, andfinally (vi) is thereanana-
lysis of the impacts of the ban and what are the results?
Examples of nationwide discard bans
The discard ban examples described in this section, summarized in
Table 1, were selected to reflect a diverse set of fisheries in terms of
species, gears, and sizes, but also of management strategies and
social realities around the world. Only cases of nationwide discard
banswere chosen. This excludes cases of discard bans that are specif-
ic to fisheries or regions (such as the case in Canada and the United
States).
Chile
The general aim of the Chilean discard ban is to increase the bio-
masses of target and non-target stocks (Table 1). The specific objec-
tives are to reducediscardsof target andnon-target species, aswell as
the incidental catch of birds, mammals, and turtles (Ministerio de
Economı´a, Fomento y Turismo, 2013a).
The term discard was first introduced in Chilean legislationwith
the Fisheries Law amendment of 2001, which also introduced an in-
dividual transferable quota (ITQ) system. Before 2001, Chile had a
“race forfish”, i.e. boatswouldfish asmuchas possible until the total
allowable catch (TAC) was reached and the fishery closed. The 2001
law prohibited discards, with no distinction between species and
sizes, and established strong sanctions to offenders, such as deduc-
tions of 30% of their ITQs (Ministerio de Economı´a, Fomento y
Turismo, 2011). These heavy sanctions made fishers uncooperative
and discards became a taboo subject, unknown in their magnitude
to the fishing authorities, while the practice of discarding continued
as normal. In recognition of these issues, the 2012 revision of the
Fisheries Law introduced fisheries exceptions to the discard ban,
conditional on aminimum2-yearmonitoring programme to quan-
tify and identify the causes of discards, and to develop and imple-
ment mitigation plans. Further exemptions may apply as long as
the following requirements are met: (i) monitoring programmes
are completed and discardmitigation plans are established, (ii) suf-
ficient technical background has been collected according to the
protocols establishedby themonitoringprogrammes, (iii) themon-
itoring programme continues to run, (iv) a global catch quota,
which accounts for discards, has been set for the target species, (v)
target and non-target species are subjected to a mitigation plan,
and (vi) discarding does not affect the conservation of the target
species. Finally, there are restrictions on the use of previously dis-
carded catches for human consumption, such as under minimum
landing sizes (MLS), but these may be lifted within the remits of
the mitigation plans.
Additional technical measures have not (yet) been implemented
with the discard ban, except that from July 2014 onwards, the
trawls used by the demersal fleet targeting crustaceans (shrimps,
prawns, etc.)were standardized and regulated through the establish-
ment of mandatory features such as dimensions, buoyancy, and
bycatch excluder systems, among others (Ministerio de Economı´a,
Fomento y Turismo, 2013b). The objectives of these changes were
to minimize (i) the capture of small or immature specimens of the
target species, (ii) the capture of bycatch, and (iii) seabed impacts.
Law compliance will be monitored by electronic monitoring
systems (EMS) in all vessels of the industrial fleet as soon as an
EMS regulation is enacted, while artisanal boats longer than 15 m
will be required to carry EMS 3 years after the EMS regulation is
enacted.Observerprogrammes, carriedout since 1990, are extended
with the new Fisheries Law, but will continue with the sole objective
of collecting biological and fisheries data to be used in scientific
advice for management, without any jurisdiction in compliance.
The impact of the Chilean discard ban is not known as it is yet to
be fully implemented. At present, there is a huge interest from the
fishing industry in these non-sanction monitoring programmes,
as they perceive the resulting transparency of their fishing opera-
tions as an opportunity to change fishing regulations and match
fishing opportunities with their real catches. At the same time,
Chilean society is increasingly concerned about the profitability
and environmental impacts of fishing activities, and open to sus-
tainability certifications. It remains to be seen if, despite the pro-
posed changes in law and surveillance, the discard ban will be fully
implemented as Chilean fleets are large and extremely diverse in
terms of gears, operations, and target species. In any case, it is
expected that the increase in at-sea monitoring will change fishing
practices, which will probably result in a change in fishing patterns
and a reduction in unwanted catch.
European Union
The European Union introduced a landing obligation from 1
January 2015, foreseen in the recently revised EU Common
Fisheries Policy (European Union, 2013). The sole objective of the
landing obligation is to reduce unwanted catch (Table 1); it is not
explicitly aimed at contributing to stock sustainability as is true
with similar legislation in other countries. Before 2015, it was
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legal, and in some circumstances compulsory, to discard part of the
catch at sea in European waters (Borges, 2015).
The landing obligation is only applicable to TAC-regulated
species in the Atlantic and to species that have a MLS in the
Mediterranean Sea, caught in European waters or by European
fishing vessels. It is implemented progressively by species and fish-
eries, starting with pelagic fisheries and fisheries in the Baltic Sea
in 2015, and to be completed by 2019 (European Union, 2013).
The landing obligation also includes three specific exemptions:
species for which fishing is prohibited, species that have high sur-
vival rates after being discarded, and catches which fall under the
de minimis exemption. The de minimis exemption is applicable
under two conditions: if there is scientific evidence that increases
in selectivity are very difficult to achieve, or to avoid disproportion-
ate costs of handling unwanted catches, but only where the bycatch
of the gear in question does not represent more than a certain per-
centage of the catch. Details on the implementation of the discard
ban are established in discard plans. Catches below minimum con-
servation reference sizes (MCRS, comparable, but not equivalent,
to the previously known MLS) have limited use and cannot be
sold for human consumption to avoid creating markets for under-
sized fish. TACs are adjusted to account for the previously discarded
part of the catch, although thedetails of this adjustment arenot clear
(European Union, 2016).
No new technical measures are foreseen to specifically accom-
pany the implementation of the EU landing obligation. There are
also no specific additional requirements for its monitoring and
control, except for an obligation to document the catches, details
of which are again to be specified in multiannual plans. Failing to
comply with the landing obligation is categorized as a serious in-
fringement under Regulation (EC) No. 1224/2009 (European
Commission, 2009), but therewill be a 2-year delay before sanctions
take effect, i.e. from 1 January 2017 (European Union, 2015).
Since the EU landing obligation is quite recent and has yet to be
fully implemented, there are few data available to assess its effect on
the fisheries and species it applies to. However, considering that
many commercial stocks are moderately to highly discarded
(ICES, 2015), if the landing obligation is fully implemented, i.e. is
monitored at-sea at significantly high levels, it is likely that fishing
operations will change to maximize the use of the space on board
and quota available for high price species and sizes. The landing
obligation could therefore represent the biggest push for more se-
lective fishing in the history of the EU Common Fisheries Policy.
There will probably be a significant change in fleet diversity, and
thus in the global harvest pattern of EU fishing fleets, as many
fishers are considering swapping fishing gears for more selective
ones. Furthermore, this is likely to affect the ecosystem megafauna
and seabed communities. Heath et al. (2014) showed that landing
the entire catch of TAC-regulated species, while fishing as usual in
the North Sea, has conservation penalties for seabirds, marine
mammals, and seabed fauna, with no benefit to fish stocks.
Norway
The discard ban in Norway is an element within a set of measures
that were deployed in support of the objectives of enhancing the ex-
ploitationpattern of commercial fish stocks and reducingunwanted
catches (Gullestad et al., 2014, 2015; Table 1). Norway first intro-
duced a discard prohibition for cod (Gadus morhua) and haddock
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus) in 1987, with the specific purpose of
reducing discard of legally sized individuals of a strong year class
of the Northeast Arctic cod (Gullestad et al., 2015). The ban wasTa
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later extended to cover other commercial species. A general discard
ban was introduced as part of a new basic Marine Resource Act
(MRA) in 2009. The overall goal of theMRA is to ensure sustainable
and economically profitable management of wild living marine
resources,while contributing to coastal employment and settlement
(Norwegian Government, 2008; Gullestad et al., 2014). The MRA
requires that all catches of commercial species, with some ex-
ceptions, are landed and can be sold through ordinary market
outlets (Norwegian Government, 2008). Echinoderms and nearly
all species of molluscs and crustaceans may, however, be discarded
(Fisheries Directorate, 2015a). Other taxonomic groups such as
sponges, jellyfish, seaweed, birds, and mammals may also be dis-
carded, although the MRA authorizes the Ministry to extend the
discard ban to such groups (Norwegian Government, 2008).
TheNorwegianTAC systemwas strengthened through the intro-
duction of individual vessel quotas for the coastal fleet in the late
1980s (Gullestad et al., 2014, 2015). In 1983, a system formandatory
real-time area closures (RTC) was introduced (Reithe and Aschan,
2004). The RTC system involves the continuous monitoring of
fishing grounds by trained inspectors on board chartered vessels;
areas are closed when inspectors register that catches of juvenile
fish exceed a certain limit. Furthermore, fishers are obliged to
move fishing grounds if they observe excessive juvenile bycatch in
a haul. The RTC system is combined with compulsory gear selectiv-
ity measures (e.g. type and minimum dimension of mesh sizes) as
well as sorting grids that became mandatory in 1997 in demersal
trawl fisheries for gadoid species (Isaksen, 2000).
Control at sea is conducted by the Norwegian coastguard, which
currently conducts around 2000 vessel inspections per year at sea
(Gullestad et al., 2015). Monitoring at sea by way of observers or
through other means is not mandatory, but observers are placed
on board a limited number of vessels to collect high-quality and
fine-scale fisheries data. However, it remains difficult to control
and monitor the discard ban at sea due to the large size of the sea
area to be controlled and associated high cost (Gezelius, 2006).
Several high-risk areas for discard ban violations have been identi-
fied for the year 2015: slipping and highgrading in pelagic fisheries,
the discarding of juvenile cod and haddock in the Barents Sea, and
the discarding of individual gadoid fish and flatfish below the MLS
in the North Sea (Fisheries Directorate, 2015b). Nevertheless, in
2000, discards in Norwegian waters amounted to just 2–8% of
total catches (Anon, 2004).
Cod and haddock discards below the minimum legal catch size
declined after the introduction of the discard ban in Norwegian
waters. However, evidence suggests this occurred in response to
the area closures, rather than the discard ban. The effect of the
Norwegian discard ban in incentivisingmore selective fishing is dif-
ficult to quantify due to ineffective monitoring and a lack of data
(Condie et al., 2014). Nevertheless, there was a general increase in
selectivity due to the combination of all themanagementmeasures.
The difficulty of controlling the discard ban, and the resulting
low chance of detecting violations, makes its implementation
inpractice highly dependent on cooperation and general acceptance
by fishers (Gezelius, 2006, 2008; Johnsen and Eliasen, 2011).
Nevertheless, Gullestad et al. (2015) contend that it is “beyond rea-
sonable doubt” that Norwegian discardmanagementmeasures and
improved exploitation patterns have contributed to the rebuilding
of cod and haddock stock in the Barents Sea, as well as leading to
substantial increases in annual yields. However, at present, not all
commercial stocks are exploited sustainably and a few are evenover-
exploited (ICES, 2015).
New Zealand
In 1986, New Zealand introduced an ITQ system to ensure the sus-
tainable utilization of fishery resources. With it came a prohibition
to return to, or abandon in the sea or any other waters, catch
of species subjected to the ITQ system (most commercial species)
over MLS (i.e. a prohibition to highgrade), and all catch for
species without an MLS (Section 72 of the 1996 Fisheries Act;
Table 1). Discarding is nevertheless allowed for species with
high survival rates listed under schedule 6 of the Fisheries Act
(Ministry of Fisheries, 1996). The prohibition to discard is asso-
ciated with the ITQ system and does not have specific objectives;
only the general objective of increasing biomass of commercial
stock applies. As with other countries, technical measures were
implemented together with the ITQ system.
New Zealand has a relatively modest enforcement regime, with
limited at-sea surveillance and monitoring undertaken by fishery
officers on board New Zealand military vessels and aircraft and a
team of observers on commercial fishing vessels. With an estimated
1500fishingvessels, theMinistryonly carriedout1567vessel inspec-
tions for compliance purposes in 2006/2007, thus achieving low
surveillance intensity. Nevertheless, the Ministry planned to in-
crease them in the following years (MRAG, 2007).
While discards under the minimum legal size are not reported,
discarding actually increased for legally sized fish following the
introduction of the ITQ system (MRAG, 2007). This happened
despite the introduction of a number of mechanisms to enable
fishers to match their catch to available fishing opportunities
without holding the relevant quota portfolio to begin with, i.e.
through leasing or buying additional quota, borrowing and
banking quota, etc. (Lock and Leslie, 2007). By 2007, discarding
was considered to be widespread and an increasing problem in
New Zealand fisheries (MRAG, 2007). According to Condie et al.
(2014), at the same time as the introduction of the discard ban
there was a small increase in selectivity, but it is difficult to assess
the impact of the discarding prohibition as accurate statistics on dis-
cards are unavailable. Nevertheless, in 2013, 69% of New Zealand
known-status stocks (92 stocks of 133 assessed stocks, out of a
total of 350 evaluated stocks) had biomasses above themanagement
targets, i.e. similar to or higher than BMSY (Ministry of Primary
Industries, 2013), suggesting that the general objective of sustain-
able fishing is being achieved.
Discard bans and selectivity
As suggested by thenationwide discard ban cases studied (and in the
specific examples givenbelow), adiscardban, if properly implemen-
ted, will be an incentive to reduce unwanted catch regardless of
whether it is accompanied by compulsory technical measures.
This is because fishers will lose space on board that could otherwise
be used to store more valuable species and/or sizes. This reduction
in unwanted catchmay be achieved by changing fishing strategy, i.e.
the time, location, or depth of fishing, or by altering gear rigging,
and deployment.
InChile, a year after implementing a researchprogrammeondis-
cards as required by law, and before official discard reduction mea-
sures were adopted, the industrial trawl fleet targeting hake
(Merluccius gayi gayi) spontaneously, and on a voluntary basis,
developed and started using exclusion grids. These are installed at
the entrance to the codend, preventing the entry of giant squids
(Dosidicus gigas), a species that has limited quota available and
thus that can close the fishery prematurely, while the quality of the
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hake catch is improved. In the EU, the so-called fully documented
fisheries trials, where all catches of a pre-agreed species were
landed, recorded, and accounted for against an increased quota,
show that fishers rapidly adapted their fishing strategies to reduce
unwanted catch (mainly juvenile fish) and effectively increased
their commercial catch (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011). InNorway, indi-
viduals in the Norwegian shrimp trawl fisheries helped design
the so-called Nordmøre grid and started using it in 1989 to reduce
the bycatch of finfish. The grid was well received by the industry,
which soon started using it on a voluntary basis, mainly because
it would grant permission to access fishing grounds that were other-
wise temporarily closed due to high bycatch rates, but also because it
improved the quality of the shrimp catch (Isaksen, 2000). Finally, in
2001, the Hoki Fishery Management Company in New Zealand
introduced avoluntary codeof conduct to reduce the catchof juven-
ile hoki (Macruronus novaezelandiae) based on different measures,
such as the requirement tomove away fromfishing areawhen a spe-
cific level of catch of juvenile fish is reached (so-called moving on
provisions), closed spawning areas, among others (MRAG, 2007).
In summary, in all cases studied discard bans have increased the
selectivity of some, if not all, of the fisheries involved by incentiviz-
ing a voluntary change in fishing behaviour, often before compul-
sory technical measures were implemented.
Discussion and conclusions
Based on the nationwide discard ban examples presented above, the
management goal for adopting a discard ban is normally to limit
(and reduce) fishing mortality and reach sustainable fisheries,
but also implicitly, and notably in relation to the EU and New
Zealand cases, to achieve effective TAC implementation. At the
same time, there is also a global objective of reducing discards for
various reasons, but always associated with an underlying purpose
of limiting the exploitation pattern towards target species and/or
sizes. Nevertheless, it is interesting that in at least two cases,
namely Chile and Norway, the discard ban is already applicable to
several taxonomic groups, instead of being limited to main com-
mercial species. This is in contrast to the New Zealand and EU
discard bans, which are only applicable to TAC and/or MLS regu-
lated species, depending on the area. Yet, the EU landing obligation
and the Norwegian discard ban could be extended to the full scope
of the underlying legislation, i.e. wild living marine resources. This
opensup thepossibilityof applying thediscardbans to a larger range
of ecosystem components, which is clearly more in line with BH.
The analysis of the discard policies examined indicates that, the
discard bans, if properly implemented, will significantly increase
fishery selectivity. Thismay result in the countries’ global harvesting
patterns becoming narrower, where the range of exploited species,
sizes, and potentially trophic levels will be reduced. We note that
the BH concept proposed by Garcia et al. (2012) is selective, but
it broadens the selectivity perspective from fleets and fisheries to
the scale of ecosystem productivity and impacts. The latter is what
may be considered to be a global harvest pattern at ecosystem
level, i.e. that the combined impact of highly selective fisheries
with different catch components may be balanced.
The implementation of a discard ban requires high levels of at-
sea monitoring and effective control, and in all the cases studied, an
increase in existing programmes. For poor (or even absent)monitor-
ing and control, as was the case in Chile and New Zealand, discard
bans may in fact increase discards, due to associated management
measures that strongly limit fishing activity and incentivize discard-
ing, such as TACs and ITQs. To counter these effects, incentivesmay
be used to promote more selective fishing. However, high levels of
at-seamonitoring and control and economic incentives are unlikely
to be available inmany countries around theworld, which limits the
applicability of discard bans as a fisheries management tool.
If properly implemented, discard bans will tend to increase stock
biomass by reducing fishing mortality, particularly on juveniles in
recovering stocks, but also by ensuring an effective implementation
of TACs. In contrast, if a discard ban is notmonitored at-sea, at best
TACs will continue to be overshot with negative impacts on the
stocks inquestion.Atworst,when linked to increasedfishingoppor-
tunities to account for the catch that would otherwise be discarded,
there will be an increase in fishing mortality for all stocks, and most
probably, increased overexploitation. For example, in the EU, TACs
are being increased to account for discards (so-called quota uplifts),
suggesting that the CFP landing obligation will create more unba-
lanced harvest. On the other hand, the partial implementation of
the ban reduces this effect.
Inmost examples presented, the objective of the discard ban is to
reduce unwanted catch instead of utilizing unused catch, as com-
monly argued in relation to a BH strategy. This situation has prob-
ably arisen because the use of otherwise discarded catch requires
changes in the market that will take time to occur, whereas many
stocks are still in a more immediate need of recovery. In fact,
some of the policies examined, such as the EU landing obligation,
prohibit the use of discards for human consumption, thus limiting
their effective use. None of the policies included a specific objective
with regard to the possible uses of discarded catch, hence limiting
future possibilities of a BH.
If full catch retention policies are implemented, they are likely to
affect the benthic and megafauna diversity, depending on the eco-
system and the importance of its scavenger benthic community.
Heath et al. (2014) showed that landing the entire catch of
TAC-regulated species in the North Sea, while fishing as usual, has
conservation penalties for seabirds, marine mammals, and seabed
fauna since they will lose potential prey. In turn, exploited fish
stocks will not necessarily benefit, as fishing mortality and exploit-
ation patterns will not be reduced to allow for stock recovery.
Furthermore, they concluded that discards represent a relatively
small subsidy to the foodweb, but that the cascading indirect eco-
logical effects of curbing their production can still be considerable.
These conclusions are also supported by Fondo et al. (2015), that to
minimize the consequences of discards removal in marine ecosys-
tems, recommend a gradual reduction in fisheries discards to a
minimal level that would maintain the ecosystem’s stability and
allow species exploiting discards to habituate to the food subsidy
reduction. Nevertheless, effective reductions in the harvest rates
resulting from changes in fishing practices to eliminate the capture
of unwanted fish can deliver conservation benefits, especially in
heavilyexploitedsystems.However,wearguethatdiscardbanpolicies
may not necessarily reduce harvest rates butwill undoubtedly change
the underlying selectivity patterns, while their benefits are unclear.
In conclusion, full catch retention policies, as currently imple-
mented, are in contradiction with a BH (Figure 1). This is probably
because their original objectives (together with the measures
deployed to achieve them) are in opposition to a BH, namely to in-
crease selectivity and likely achieving a more focused global harvest
pattern. However, if discard bans were set differently, they could
help to achieve and maintain more BH. Their goals should be in
line with BH, i.e. to reach a wider global harvest pattern, or at least
be establishedwithinmanagement regimes that promote high com-
pliance, for instance, through incentive mechanisms or effective
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monitoring and control. Finally, the extent to which a discard ban
contributes to achieve a more BH depends also on the relative im-
portance of the ecosystem benthic and megafauna components.
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